Jaemin Lee, 'A More Widely Available Public Good: Proposed DSU Reform and Its Implication for Developing Members' (2017) 51 Journal of World Trade, Issue 6, pp. 987–1019
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) amendment negotiation aims to fix structural problems identified through the application of the DSU since 1995 and to introduce more detailed and coherent provisions in the DSU so as to enhance rule of law. What has not received an adequate attention in this discussion, however, is possible implication of certain DSU amendment proposals vis-à-vis developing Members. Some of the proposals being tabled, while providing an important contribution to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) by filing the loopholes in the system, could arguably pose new challenges to developing Members’ enhanced participation in a future DSM. On the other hand, some of the proposals for strengthened S&D treatment in the DSU, as proposed by certain developing Members, may run the risk of negatively affecting the neutrality of the WTO as an adjudicator. An amended DSU should be designed to enhance the participation of developing Members, but at the same time specific methods to facilitate the participation should be carefully chosen for the integrity of an international adjudicating proceeding. This article looks into these aspects of the DSU amendment negotiation. It provides suggestions to accommodate the interest of developing Members while maintaining the integrity of the dispute settlement proceedings, so as to achieve the basic objectives of the DSU amendment negotiation.
Jaemin Lee, 'A More Widely Available Public Good: Proposed DSU Reform and Its Implication for Developing Members' (2017) 51 Journal of World Trade, Issue 6, pp. 987–1019
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) amendment negotiation aims to fix structural problems identified through the application of the DSU since 1995 and to introduce more detailed and coherent provisions in the DSU so as to enhance rule of law. What has not received an adequate attention in this discussion, however, is possible implication of certain DSU amendment proposals vis-à-vis developing Members. Some of the proposals being tabled, while providing an important contribution to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) by filing the loopholes in the system, could arguably pose new challenges to developing Members’ enhanced participation in a future DSM. On the other hand, some of the proposals for strengthened S&D treatment in the DSU, as proposed by certain developing Members, may run the risk of negatively affecting the neutrality of the WTO as an adjudicator. An amended DSU should be designed to enhance the participation of developing Members, but at the same time specific methods to facilitate the participation should be carefully chosen for the integrity of an international adjudicating proceeding. This article looks into these aspects of the DSU amendment negotiation. It provides suggestions to accommodate the interest of developing Members while maintaining the integrity of the dispute settlement proceedings, so as to achieve the basic objectives of the DSU amendment negotiation.